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THE IMPACT OF ENTITLEMENT ANALYSIS:
DUE PROCESS IN CORRECTIONAL
ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS*
THOMPSON

H. GooDiNG, JR.**

State and federal courts have significantly expanded the scope of constitutional due process protections to which prisoners are entitled. One impetus to
this development is the growing awareness that arbitrary deprivation of
prisoners' and parolees' rights adversely affects a state's interest in the orderly
administration of its correctional institutions and the rehabilitation of its
inmates. Abandoning past doctrines, courts have embraced the principle that
inmates' and parolees' constitutional rights cannot lawfully be diluted beyond
the extent necessary for orderly prison administration.
Contemporary judicial decisions dealing with prisoners' and parolees' constitutional rights employ two major analytical models: "entitlement analysis"
and "impact analysis." This article will use these models to analyze the due
process protections afforded prisoners and parolees in the three most significant
correctional administrative proceedings: parole revocation hearings, parole
release hearings, and prison disciplinary proceedings. First, to gain a proper
perspective of the issues involved, a brief history of the growth of the due
process protections in the correctional setting will be presented. Next, an overall framework will be discussed to illustrate how the Supreme Court currently
examines due process protection claims. Finally, a review and critical analysis
of the current minimum due process requirements in each of the three proceedings will be presented along with suggestions for reform.
HISroucAL ViEw

Prior to the 1960s, correctional litigation was characterized by what is now
known as the "hands-off" doctrine.1 Courts used this doctrine to avoid con*Copyright 1981 by Thompson H. Gooding, Jr.
**B.S., Florida State University, 1974; M.B.A., University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill,
1976; J.D., Tulane University School of Law, 1981. The author wishes to gratefully acknowledge
the invaluable research and editorial assistance provided by Mary B. Gooding at every stage of
the development of this article. Thanks are also owed to Professors Billups Percy and Catherine Hancock of Tulane University School of Law, Nathalie M. Walker-Dittman, and Stevan
Dittman for their helpful suggestions.
1. See, e.g., Washington v. Haban, 287 F.2d 32, 334 (3d Cir. 1960); Ortega v. Ragen, 216
F.2d 561, 562 (5th Cir. 1954); Hiatt v. Compagna, 178 F.2d 42, 46 (5th Cir. 1949), aL'd mem.,
340 U.S. 880 (1950). See generally Note, Parole Status and the Privilege Concept, 1969 DUKE
LJ. 189; Note, Parole:A Critique of its Legal Foundationsand Conditions, 88 N.Y.U.L. Rv.
702 (1963); Note, Beyond the Ken of the Courts: A Critique of JudicialRefusal to Review
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sideration of prisoners' and parolees' complaints charging violation of their
constitutional rights. In its earliest form, the hands-off policy reflected the
theory that a prisoner is no more than a slave of the state. 2 The subsequent
abandonment of the slave of the state rationale did not, however, end the
prisoner's inability to assert his rights. Courts soon developed the concept that
lawful state imprisonment necessarily resulted in a restriction of many privileges
and rights due to the unique circumstances and considerations underlying the
penal system.3 This notion, under the labels of "legislative grace," "custody,"
"parens patriae," and "rights versus privilege,"4 continued to effectively preclude judicial interference in the internal affairs of correctional systems. Absent a showing of exceptional circumstances, 5 a prisoner could not enforce the
rights enjoyed by free citizens. The courts generally refused even to examine
the merits of an inmate's complaint that he had been denied a constitutional
right.6
The most important of the traditional justifications for judicial restraint
was the "rights versus privilege" distinction, which provided that fifth and
fourteenth amendment due process protections attached only to those interests
which could be characterized as rights rather than privileges.7 This distinction
separates interests that are enforceable rights from privileges, which are grants
from the state that are subject to withdrawal at the state's whim. By simply
labeling all aspects of penal existence as privileges, courts were able to refuse
consideration of complaints raised by inmates who were deprived of these
privileges.
The demise of the hands-off doctrine led to an expansion of prisoners'
rights in a variety of settings. Demanding that prison conditions comport with
the first, eighth, and fourteenth amendments, courts have protected prisoners
from racial discrimination, 8 constant danger of inmate assault,9 excessive corthe Complaints of Convicts, 72 YALE L.J. 506 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Beyond the Ken of
the Courts].
2. Ruffin v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. (21 Grant) 790, 796 (1871).
3. Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 285 (1948).
4. For a discussion of these older theories, see generally Note, ProceduralDue Process in
Peno-CorrectionalAdministration:Progressionand Regression, 45 ST. JOHNs L. Rrv. 468 (1971);
Beyond the Ken of the Courts,supra note 1.
5. Federal courts have described the term "exceptional circumstances" in various ways.
See, e.g., Douglas v. Sigler, 386 F.2d 684, 688 (8th Cir. 1967) (extreme cases); Glenn v.
Ciccone, 370 F.2d 361, 363 (8th Cir. 1966) (showing of cruel and unusual punishment); Lee v.
Tahash, 352 F.2d 970, 971 (8th Cir. 1965) (extreme cases); Carey v. Settle, 351 F.2d 483, 485
(8th Cir. 1965) (only in a rare and exceptional situation); Roberts v. Pegelow, 313 F.2d 548,
550 (4th Cir. 1963) (vindictive, cruel or inhuman).
6. See Note, Prisoner'sRights Under Section 1983, 57 GEo. L.J. 1270, 1273-74 (1969).
7. The rights-privilege distinction in viewing claims of constitutional rights has now been
thoroughly discredited. See, e.g., Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 571 (1972); Graham
v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 374 (1971); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539 (1971); Goldberg v.
Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 (1970); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 627 n.6 (1969); Sherbert
v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963). See generally Van Alstyne, The Demise of the RightsPrivilege Distinction in ConstitutionalLaw, 81 HARv. L. Rlv. 1439 (1968).
8. Battle v. Anderson, 376 F. Supp. 402, 420-28 (E.D. Okla. 1974); Washington v. Lee,
263 F. Supp. 327, 333 (M.D. Ala. 1966), aff'd per curiam, 390 U.S. 333 (1968).
9. Woodhous v. Virginia, 487 F.2d 889, 890 (4th Cir. 1973); Penn v. Oliver, 351 F. Supp.
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poral punishmento and unjustifiable restrictions on the rights to practice religion, read, speak, and correspond."' Furthermore, the courts have prevented
interference with prisoners' right to counsel and access to adequate legal materials.12 The recent judicial recognition of prisoners' constitutional rights has
also resulted in the extension of procedural due process safeguards to correctional system administrative hearings dealing with parole revocation, parole
release, and prison discipline.3
PRocEDuRAL DuE PaocFss MODEL

The traditional view of due process under the United States Constitution
provides that an individual is entitled to due process protections whenever the
government makes a decision based upon facts unique to the individual that
has a substantial adverse impact upon that individual's life, liberty, or property2.4 Fundamental fairness, considered the touchstone of due process, requires
that an individual be given an opportunity to be heard in order to reduce the
risk of error in the government's decision-making process. 5 Deciding whether
an individual is entitled to due process protections involves the resolution of
two analytically distinct issues: whether the right to due process protections
applies to the particular situation, and if so, exactly what procedures the circumstances require.16 Thus, a court must initially ascertain whether the challenged governmental action adversely affects a life, liberty or property interest
that is within the protective ambit of the due process clause. The right to due
process protections is triggered by a finding that a protected interest is affected.17
1292, 1294 (E.D. Va. 1972); Holt v. Sarver, 300 F. Supp. 825, 828 (E.D. Ark. 1969).
10. Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571, 579 (8th Cir. 1968); Talley v. Stephens, 247 F. Supp.
683, 689 (E.D. Ark. 1965).
11. Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 (1972) (religion); Cooper v. Pate, 378 U.S. 546, 546
(1964) (religion); Brown v. Peyton, 437 F.2d 1228, 1231 (4th Cir. 1971) (state must show
paramount state interest to justify depriving prisoner's religious rights); Jackson v. Godwin,
400 F.2d 529, 535 (5th Cir. 1968) (black prisoners have right to receive black-oriented publications in prison); Fortune Soc'y v. McGinnis, 319 F. Supp. 901, 905 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (prison
officials cannot deny prisoners access to newsletter absent a compelling state interest); Carothers
v. Follette, 314 F. Supp. 1014, 1024 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (prison officials must show justification to
restrict prisoners' right of free expression through the mails).
12. Houghton v. Shafer, 392 U.S. 639, 640 (1968); Ex parte Hull, 312 U.S. 546, 549 (1941);
Gilmore v. Lynch, 319 F. Supp. 105, 109 (N.D. Cal. 1970), aff'd per curiam sub noma., Younger
v. Gilmore, 404 U.S. 15 (1971).
13. See text accompanying notes 39 & 56 infra.
14. Losses inflicted by the state, imposed on the basis of unique facts, trigger the procedural safeguards of due process. The detrimental effects of legislative actions, made on the
basis of group facts, do not invoke such protections. Compare Londoner v. City & County of
Denver, 210 U.S. 373 (1908) with Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S.
441 (1915). Both types of decision-making are, of course, subject to the protections afforded by
all other constitutional guarantees. See generally I K. DAvis, ADMiNISTRATIvE LAw TRnATis
§7.01 (1958).
15. Dent v. West Va., 129 U.S. 114, 123 (1889).
16. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1971).
17. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 (1970). The Court in Goldberg recognized
that whether procedural safeguards are required depends upon the impact on the individual
of the state's action rather than on the rights- privilege theory, which it rejected. The Court
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In deciding the second question concerning what protections are due, the court
must balance the individual's interest in avoiding the loss inflicted by the state
against the competing interest of the state in summary action.'
The threshold inquiry is of particular significance because the existence of
the right to procedural safeguards is dependent on a finding that a protected
interest is affected by the governmental action. Two major analytical models
exist in contemporary judicial decisions regarding prisoners' and parolees' constitutional right to procedural safeguards. These models may best be described
as "entitlement analysis" and "impact analysis."
The entitlement view of due process is based on the theory that requiring
due process presupposes the existence of an independent legal right. In the
absence of such an independently grounded legal right, the entitlement view
provides no basis for invoking the fourteenth amendment's protections. 19 The
crucial issue in applying entitlement analysis is to define the permissible sources
of substantive rights which invoke constitutional protections. Entitlements
triggering due process might be said to arise only under specific provisions of
constitutions, statutes, administrative rules, and regulations. Under a broader
view, entitlements could also be seen to emanate from the concept of fundamental or inalienable rights and protections. With the availability of this wide
range of potential sources of rights, courts under the entitlement view could
take either an expansive2° or narrow2 ' approach to the application of the fourteenth amendment. The Supreme Court appears to have taken the narrower
approach in its recent decisions concerning due process in the correctional environment.22
relied on Professor Charles Reich's now famous article, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733
(1964), to find that the welfare benefits at issue were a statutory entitlement, or "property," of
qualified recipients and, as such, could not be terminated without procedural guarantees
against arbitrary decisions.
18. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262-64 (1970).
19. See, e.g., Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976) (public employment); Paul v. Davis,
424 U.S. 693 (1976) (impairment of reputation by police); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975)
(public education); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972) (public employment); Bell
v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971) (driver's license). But see Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215 (1976)
(no entitlement invokiing procedural safeguards of inmates transferred from one prison to another). See generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 522-32 (1978); Comment, Entitlement, Enjoyment, and Due Process of Law, 1974 DUKE L.J. 89.
20. For example, the Court expanded the application of due process by taking a broad
view of property in Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972), where the Court held due process
protections were required before repossession of goods under a state replevin statute would be
allowed. The decision emphasized the fact that the goods seized (a stove, bed, stereo, table,
etc.) were not "necessities" was not a determinative factor. Id. at 88. Rather, the due process
clause was interpreted to require a hearing before a property deprivation occurs through a
repossession statute. Id. at 88-90. See also Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975) where the Court
took a broad view of entitlement in holding due process applies to suspension from public
schools.
21. For examples of the Court's use of a narrow entitlement analysis, see Codd v. Velger,
429 U.S. 624 (1977); Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215 (1976); Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341
(1976); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
22. See Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Neb. Penal & Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1 (1979);
Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215 (1976).
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The impact view of due process is based on a concept of life, liberty, and
property that encompasses substantive or core values of importance to the in23
dividual in the particular decisional context. No single variable triggers due
process protections; instead, the effect of the state action on the individual determines whether constitutional protections are needed. Rather than focusing
on the existence of a formal legal entitlement, impact analysis examines
whether the governmental action will result in a significant adverse impact on
the individual. This adverse impact has been held by the Supreme Court to be
24
sufficient to mandate procedural protection.
Upon finding that an individual's interests are constitutionally protected,
inquiry is directed to the question of what due process safeguards are required.
In formulating procedural protections, the Supreme Court has rejected the
notion that due process prescribes one set of inflexible procedures applicable
to every conceivable situation.2 5 The Court has stated that the procedures
needed must be responsive to specific factual contexts because all situations
2
requiring due process safeguards do not require the same kind of protection;
the objective of due process, to minimize error and reduce the danger of arbithrough varying protrary governmental action, can be sufficiently attained
27
environment.
decisional
specific
a
to
cedures tailored
A balancing approach has long been an element in the formulation of
procedural due process requirements in a given situation. 28 Nevertheless, guidelines for the determination of what process is due under this balancing approach
have only recently been announced by the Supreme Court. The Court stated
that:

23. See, e.g., Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88 (1976) (aliens and deportation);

Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564 (1973) (right to follow a chosen profession); Gagnon v.

Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973) (probation revocation hearing); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S.
471 (1972) (parole revocation proceeding); Willner v. Committee on Character, 373 U.S. 96
(1963) (right to practice law); Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957) (same);

Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954) (racial segregation). See generally L. TRmr, supra note
19, at 506-22; Tribe, StructuralDue Process, 10 HARv. C.R.-C.L.L. REv. 269 (1975); Comment,
Two Views of a Prisoner'sRights to Due Process: Meachum v. Fano, 12 HARV. C.R.-C.L.L.

REv. 405 (1977).
24. See Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828 (1977) (law libraries or assistance from persons
with legal training required in order to preserve inmates' "fundamental constitutional right"
of access to courts); Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782 (1973) (Morrissey-type preliminary
and final hearing required since probation revocation results in loss of liberty); Morrissey v.
Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480-81 (1972) (termination of parole xequires "some orderly process,
however informal" since parolee's liberty interest is affected).
25. Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961); Joint
Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 US. 123, 162-63 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., con-

curring).
26. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972); Hannah v. Larche, 863 U.S. 420, 442

(1960).
27. L. TarE,supra note 19, at 503. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67,97 (1972).
28. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972). See generally Note, Specifying the
Procedures Required by Due Process: Toward Limits on the Use of Interest-Balancing,88
Hiv.L. Rvv.1510, 1537 (1974).
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[The] identification of the specific dictates of due process generally requires consideration of three distinct factors: first, the private interest
that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and
the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the government's interest, including the function
involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens29 that the additional
or substitute procedural requirements would entail.
Thus, the Court requires a weighing of the individual interest infringed, discounted by the probability that alternative procedures would be more likely
to protect the interest, against the added cost or burden of such alternative
procedures. 80
Although this formula appears to emphasize the cost of protections, the
Court has also indicated that. while cost considerations are important, the cost
31
of protecting a constitutional right cannot singularly justify its total denial.
Noting that procedural due process is not designed to promote governmental
efficiency,32 the Court has concluded that safeguards must be afforded to protectible interests "if that may be done without prohibitive cost."33
Thus, in addressing new claims for due process protections, the Court will
first look for the existence of a protectible interest requiring procedural safeguards, employing either an entitlement or an impact analysis. Upon making
such a finding, a balancing process will be employed by the Court to prescribe
the safeguards necessary to protect the individual's life, liberty, or property
interest threatened by the particular governmental action.
CORRECTIONAL ADMINIsTRATIvE HEAMNGS

Utilizing the model outlined above, the due process protections currently
required in correctional administrative hearings will be analyzed in the context
of the three settings considered to have the most significant effect on prisoners
and parolees: parole revocation hearings, prison disciplinary proceedings and
parole release hearings.
ParoleRevocation Hearings
Parole is a temporal and spatial variation of imprisonment. Its function is
to reintegrate individuals into society as constructive members as soon as they
are able, without confining them for the full term of the original sentence. The
essence of parole is release from prison before completion of the sentence, on
the condition that the prisoner abide by certain rules during the balance of
that sentence. 34 Nevertheless, parolees are still considered subject to the state's
29. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
30. L. TRIBE, supra note 19. See also Mashaw, The Supreme Court's Due Process Calculus
For Administrative Adjudication in Mathews v. Eldridge: Three Factors in Search of a
Theory of Value, 44 U. Cm. L. REv. 28 (1976).
31. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 825 (1977).
32. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 90 n.22 (1972).
33. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 580 (1975) (emphasis added).
34. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480-82 (1972).
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correctional system. The state has merely modified the conditions of confinement by allowing the parolee to return to society while continuing to enforce
restrictions such as limitations on travel and certain other activities. Parole
revocation is a termination by the state of this conditional release and a return
of the parolee to full custody within a penal institution for the remainder of
his sentence.
Before the 1972 decision in Morrissey v. Brewer, 5 courts held that parolees
subject to parole revocation proceedings had no due process rights13 This view 7
was based on the premise that the grant of parole is an "act of grace" by the
state. 8s Having magnanimously granted parole, the state could freely terminate
it.
This view changed, however, when the Morrissey Court held that a parolee's
constitutional right to due process is violated when his parole is revoked without a hearing that observes certain minimal due process requirements. 9 Factoring the due process claim into its current two-step approach,40 the Court reached
its holding by first finding an interest requiring procedural safeguards. The
Court noted that a parolee's liberty, although conditional, includes many of
the core values of unqualified liberty, the loss of which grievously affects the
parolee. 41 Thus, the Court used impact analysis42 to determine that a parolee
has a significant interest in maintaining his conditional liberty and therefore
is entitled to fourteenth amendment protection against the grievous loss or
impact which would result from arbitrary parole revocation.
The state, on the other hand, has a substantial interest in being able to return the parolee to prison without the burden of a new criminal trial. However,
this interest only arises when the parolee has in fact violated the conditions of
his parole release; the government has no interest in revoking parole erroneously. 43 The state is also interested in restoring the parolee to a normal
and useful life. Therefore, it has an interest in preventing erroneous revocation
of parole and in treating the parolee facing revocation with basic fairness.
After finding that a constitutionally protected interest was at stake, the
85. 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
86. See, e.g., Morrissey v. Brewer, 443 F.2d 942, 952 (8th Cir. 1971), reted, 408 U.S. 471
(1972); Allen v. Perini, 424 F.2d 134 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 US. 906 (1970); Eason v.
Dickson, 890 F.2d 585 (9th Cir.), cert. denied. 392 U.S. 914 (1968); Rose v. Haskins, 888 F.2d
91 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 946 (1968); Williams v. Dunbar, 877 F.2d 505 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 889 U.S. 866 (1967); Hyser v. Reed, 318 F.2d 225 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 875 U.S.
957 (1968); Johnson v. Tinsley, 234 F. Supp. 866 (D. Colo.), aff'd, 337 F.2d 856 (10th Cir.

1964).
37. See notes 1-7 and accompanying text supra, for a discussion of the various theories
underlying the hands-off approach of courts before the mid-1960's in viewing calls by prisoners
and parolees for due process protections.
88. Escoe v. Zerbst, 295 U.S. 490, 492-93 (1985): "Probation or suspension of sentence comes
as an act of grace to one convicted of a crime, and may be coupled with such conditions in
respect of its duration as Congress may impose."
89. 408 U.S. 471 (1972).

40.
41.
42.
43.

See notes 14-24 and accompanying text, supra.
408 US. at 482.
See notes 23-24 and accompanying text, supra.
408 US. at 484.
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Court balanced 44 the competing interests of the parolee and the state to formulate the specific minimum safeguards needed. A two-stage revocation hearing
process was required because certain preliminary questions should be answered
soon after the arrest and detainment of the alleged parole violator. The first
hearing should be a minimal inquiry designed to determine whether there is
probable cause or reasonable grounds to believe the arrested parolee has violated the conditions of his parole.45 This initial hearing should be held at or
near the place of arrest or alleged parole violations, and as promptly as convenient after the arrest, while information is fresh and witnesses are readily
available.
At this hearing the parolee facing revocation has a number of procedural
rights: to receive written notice of the claimed parole violations; to hear the
evidence against him; to be heard in person and to present witnesses and documentary evidence on his behalf; to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses (unless the hearing officer specifically finds good cause for not allowing
such confrontation); to have the probable cause determination made by someone who is not directly involved in the case, but who need not be a judicial
officer or lawyer; and to be given a written statement by the fact-finders of the
evidence relied upon and the reasons for revoking parole. 40 The parolee also
has the right to counsel if the hearing body finds that the parolee asserts a
47
colorable claim of innocence.
If requested by the parolee, a second hearing must be held on a timely basis
following the initial hearing. This hearing must entail a final evaluation of any
contested relevant facts and a determination of whether the facts warrant
revocation of the parole status.4 8 The hearing body must be neutral and detached, like a traditional parole board. Its members, as with the initial hearing,
49
need not be judicial officers or lawyers.
These required procedural safeguards evolve logically from the current due
process model. An interest has been found that requires constitutional protection. Procedural safeguards have been formulated which attempt to equitably
balance the competing interests involved. The requirements guard against the
state being forced to have a full-scale criminal trial to revoke parolee status.
The state is able to use an informal hearing device to make a decision concerning the alleged parole violations. On the other hand, the parolee is afforded certain basic rights designed to protect his liberty interest from arbitrary deprivation. He is provided rights designed to insure that both sides of
contested issues are brought before the decision maker, thus minimizing the
risk of an erroneous decision by the state regarding his parole status.
One criticism may be made, however, of the Court's balancing of the conflicting interests involved. Without comment, the Court noted in Morrissey
that "sometimes revocation occurs when the parolee is accused of another crime;
44. See notes 28-30 and accompanying text, supra.
45. 408 U.S. at 486.
46. Id. at 489.
47. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 790 (1973).

48. 408 U.S. at 488.
49. Id. at 489.
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it is often preferred to a new prosecution because of the procedural ease of
recommitting the individual on the basis of a lesser showing by the State."50
Here, the Court appears to sanction the practice of sending an individual to
prison for a crime of which he has not been convicted. The parolee could be
totally innocent of an alleged offense. Yet, he could be sent to prison for a
crime of which he was never tried and convicted. The use of parole revocation
to circumvent the rights due anybody accused of a crime should be condemned,
not condoned, regardless of the interests involved.
The state certainly has an interest in preventing its parole revocation proceeding from becoming a prosecution in which the full panoply of rights due
a criminal defendant must be afforded. Nevertheless, these rights should be
afforded when the parole revocation is based upon an accusation of criminal
conduct, rather than the violation of some non.criminal parole condition such
as travel restriction. To allow parole revocation to substitute for a conviction
in a criminal trial gives far too much weight to the state's interest in returning
a parole violator to prison without a new criminal trial. This use of parole revocation ignores the parolee's right to be tried and convicted before being punished for a crime. Society also has a strong interest in assuring that only those
properly convicted in a criminal trial are punished for their alleged criminal
acts.
The procedural safeguards required for parole revocations based upon
violations of a non-criminal conditions should be distinguished from those

safeguards required for parole revocations founded purely on the accusation
that the parolee has committed a criminal act. In the latter situation, the compelling interest of the parolee's right to be tried and convicted before being

punished for a crime requires that he be afforded all of the rights due one
accused of a criminal act.
PrisonDisciplinaryProceedings
Prison disciplinary hearings involve a decision by the correctional facility
administration as to whether an inmate has violated a prison rule or regulation.
The disciplinary action that prison officials may take will vary with the particular jurisdiction's legislation on the matter. It will generally range from loss
of privileges51 for minor infractions to loss of "good-time" credit 52 or solitary
confinement for serious misconduct.
Historically, courts would not hear prisoner complaints concerning prison
regulations or disciplinary sanctions imposed for their violation absent a showing of exceptional circumstances. 3 Consistent with the hands-off doctrine regarding inmate constitutional rights,5 4 courts refused to become involved in
prison disciplinary procedures. Applying the separation of powers doctrine, the
50. Id. at 479.

51. Such privileges include access to recreational facilities, trustee status, and exercise
period or "yard time."
52. Good-time credits are reductions of the prisoner's sentence awarded for good behavior and are subject to forfeiture as punishment for serious misconduct.
53. See note 5 supra.
54. For a discussion of the hands-off doctrine see notes 1-7 and accompanying text, supra.
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courts reasoned that prison operation is an executive function and thus judicial
8
interference was precluded. 5
In Wolf v. McDonells 6 however, the Supreme Court held that prisoners
must be afforded due process safeguards in disciplinary hearings for serious
misconduct involving the potential sanctions of loss of good-time credits57 or
imposition of solitary confine mentr s Due process safeguards were not mandated
for disciplinary hearings not involving serious misconduct. In Meachum v.
Fano5 9 the prisoner was subject to a disciplinary proceeding involving a transfer to a prison where conditions of confinement were substantially less favorable
to the inmate than the existing facility. The Supreme Court held that there
was no protectable interest involving due process safeguards unless such transfer was imposed for serious misconduct.
Thus, the Court has distinguished disciplinary hearings for serious misconduct 60 from those dealing with less serious infractions. The Court appears to
be using an impact analysis because hearings for serious misconduct will have
a more significant impact on the inmate. A closer reading of the decisions,
however, reveals that the Court is neither clear nor consistent in the methodol61
ogy it employs.
The Wolff decision is ambiguous in its analysis of whether due process protections must be afforded. The Court apparently used both impact and entitlement analysis in finding that procedural safeguards are required in disciplinary
hearings for serious misconduct. The decision employed an entitlement analysis
to find that loss of good-time credits involves a constitutionally protected interest. The majority explicitly based its holding on a statutory entitlement 62 to
63
such credits.
The Court utilized the impact analysis approach to determine whether the
solitary confinement sanction necessitated procedural protections. Because
solitary confinement represented a major change in the conditions of confinement, minimum procedural safeguards were required to prevent arbitrary imposition of the sanction.6 4 The Court recognized that the imposition of solitary
confinement had a significant impact on the inmate. Constitutional safeguards
were found necessary even though there was no entitlement to non-solitary confinement.
The Wolff decision thus employed both methods of procedural due process
55. R. SINGER & W. STATSKY,
581 (1974).
56. 418 U.S. 539 (1974).

RIGHTS OF THE IMPRISONED: CASES,

MATERIALS

&

DIREcrIONS

57. Id. at 555.
58. Id. at 571 n.19.
59. 427 U.S. 215, 216 (1976).
60. The Court does not, however, specify what it considers serious misconduct. It appears to leave this dcfinition to each state's particular statutory scheme governing prison
discipline. See id. at 228, 418 U.S. at 546-48.
61. 418 U.S. at 558-59.
62. Id. at 558.
63. The Court failed even to mention the impact analysis of Morrissey in discussing good
time credits.
64. 418 U.S. at 571 n.19.
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analysis without attempting to distinguish them. This confusion was aggravated
because, although the Wolff majority based its holding upon the prisoner's
statutory entitlement, the dissenters claimed that the majority actually adopted
65
the "grievous loss" or impact analysis.
The confusion may have been settled by the Court's decision two years later
in Meachum, regarding the sanction of prison transfer for non-serious misconduct. The Court found no entitlement- in prison transfers triggering procedural safeguards. While explicitly reaffirming the Wolff view that an inmate
is not stripped of his rights just because he is a prisoner, 67 the Court rejected
the notion that any grievous loss by a person at the hands of the state was sufficient to trigger due process. 68 Thus, the Court appears to adopt a narrow
statutory entitlement analysis in its approach to whether procedural safeguards
are constitutionally required. It arguably left the door open for impact analysis
where there is no particular statutory entitlement, but where the loss of the
interest would perhaps be so grievous as to necessitate due process protections.
The Court's failure to affirmatively adopt and consistently apply one or the
other of the methodologies results in confusion for both state officials and
prisoners. Impact analysis is the most logical and consistent way to approach
the initial due process question with respect to prison disciplinary proceedings.
Under such an analysis, proceedings for serious misconduct, and their correspondingly more serious penalties, may be distinguished from hearings where
less serious charges and sanctions are at issue. The prisoner is protected from
arbitrarily imposed serious penalties, but the state is not burdened when it
imposes less severe disciplinary sanctions which have a comparatively minor
impact on the prisoner. Although the Court's recent decisions have yielded the
same results, explicit adoption of impact analysis would provide a consistent
approach to the problems and interests involved.
Regardless of the methodology employed, once it is determined that a protectible interest exists, the traditional balancing approach 69 has been used to
formulate the due process procedures required in a prison disciplinary hearing.
The inmate obviously has a strong desire to avoid arbitrary punishment for
alleged misconduct. This must be weighed against the state's three primary
interests: not encasing its prison disciplinary procedures in an inflexible constitutional straightjacket that would necessarily call for adversary proceedings
typical of a criminal trial; having disciplinary proceedings which will not raise
the level of confrontation between staff and inmates, and thus make more difficult the utilization of the disciplinary process as a tool to advance the rehabilitative goals of the institution; and maintaining an acceptable level of
security and discipline, given the uniqueness of the prison environment and
70
purpose.
In balancing these interests, the Wolff Court delineated procedures neces65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

Id. at 581 n.1 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
427 U.S. at 216.
Id. at 225.
Id. at 224.
418 U.S. at 562-65.
Id. at 563.
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sary to afford minimum due process protections in disciplinary proceedings for
serious misconduct. The prisoner facing such charges must be afforded the
right to a hearing, the right to twenty-four hour advance notice of the charges
against him, and the right to remain silent, although his employment of that
right may be used against him. He also has a limited right to present documentary evidence and call witnesses, subject to prison officials' discretion to
refuse to allow witnesses that may create a risk of reprisal or undermine institutional authority, and the right to a written statement by the factfinders as to
1
the evidence relied upon and the reasons for any ensuing disciplinary action.
The Court said there is no right, however, to confront and cross-examine ad73
verse witnesses, 72 nor a right to either retained or appointed counsel.
These mandated procedures may be criticized in several respects for according too much weight to the state's interests and too little attention to a prisoner's vulnerability to summary disciplinary action. Certain modifications should
be made to the existing required safeguards to lessen the chance of arbitrary or
erroneous disciplinary decisions without increasing the burden on the state.
Specifically, the requirement of twenty-four hour advance notice of charges
against the prisoner should be extended to three to five days.74 Twenty-four
hours is simply not an adequate amount of time to fulfill the traditional constitutional function of notice as a due process protection.75
Effective protection of prisoners' rights does not necessitate counsel in all
76
disciplinary proceedings. However, requiring adequate counsel-substitute
would help insure that all facts were appropriately presented to the factfinders77 without unduly giving the proceeding an adversary cast, reducing the
correctional utility of the hearing, delaying the proceeding, or imposing an
administrative burden.7 8 A related issue concerns proceedings in which the inmate faces charges that might be asserted later in a criminal prosecution. The
right to counsel is imperative in such situations because the prisoner's statements in the disciplinary proceeding could be admitted as evidence in any resulting criminal trial. 9 It would appear that the reasoning behind the

71. Id. at 564-66. See also Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308 (1976).
72. 418 U.S. at 567-68.
73. Id. at 570; Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 314-15 (1976).
74. See MODEL RULES AND REGULATIONS ON PRISONERS' RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES 159
(1973). One district court held, prior to the Wolff decision, that due process required a seven
day advance notice. Clutchette v. l'rocunier, 328 F. Supp. 767, 782 (N.D. Cal. 1971).
75. Notice must be "reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their
objections." Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314-15 (1950).
76. Appropriate counsel-substitute might be a fellow inmate, someone from the prison's
non-custodial staff, or law students.
77. Counsel-substitute is currently mandated only for illiterate prisoners or when the
issues are so complex that it is "unlikely that the inmate will be able to collect and present
the evidence necessary for an adequate comprehension of the case." 418 U.S. at 570.
78. These were the reasons of the Court for denying a right to counsel in prison disciplinary hearings. Id.; Baxter v. 1Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 314-15 (1976).
79. See Clutchette v. Procunier, 328 F. Supp. 767, 778 (N.D. Cal. 1971).
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Mirandaso decision is fully applicable where an inmate potentially faces criminal charges.
The prisoner's use of his fifth amendment s' right to remain silent should
not be used against him. Permitting a negative inference to be drawn from the
inmate's exercise of that right allows the imposition of a substantial sanction
on the inmate's exercise of the right to remain silent, undermining that constitutional protection.8 2 It is difficult to fathom any exigencies of the correctional environment which warrant the effective negation of this fundamental
constitutional guarantee.
As a safeguard against abuse of discretion, prison officials should be required
to record their reasons for denying the accused inmate the right to call witnesses.83 Although the Court has noted that such a procedure is preferable s4 it
has refused to make this a mandatory requirement.8 5 Unless the committee puts
its reasons in writing, a prisoner has virtually no means of proving an abuse of
discretion in a habeas corpus suit. Without a written record before it, the reviewing court would have no means of knowing whether or not the prison disciplinary committee abused its discretionary powers.
Finally, the prisoner should be given a limited right of confrontation and
cross-examination of adverse witnesses similar to that afforded parolees at a
parole revocation hearing.88 Prison officials would have the discretion to deny
this right if there was a risk of reprisal or a threat to prison authority. A written
record should be made of the reasons for denial of this right, as when the right
to call witnesses is refused.87
The rights of a prisoner facing serious penalty for misconduct are not the
same as those he has when he faces a less serious penalty, such as loss of privileges. No suggestion is made here that the above procedural safeguards should
be afforded when an inmate faces charges of less than serious misconduct. But
when the charges involve serious misconduct, the above procedures would enhance protection of the accused prisoner from arbitrary disciplinary action
without significantly increasing the state's administrative burden or jeopardizing the tight discipline and control necessary in the prison environment.
ParoleRelease Hearings
Parole release is a decision by government officials, usually a parole board,
that a prisoner is ready for conditional release from full-time custody so that
he may begin his reintegration into society.88 There is no constitutional right
80. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 469-70 (1966) (presence of counsel protects the accused's rights throughout the process of interrogation, reduces the possibility of coercion, and
helps guarantee accuracy of statements offered by the prosecutor at trial).
81. U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
82. Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 325-36 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
83. 418 U.S. at 566.
'84. Id.

85.
86.
87.
88.

Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 320 (1976).
See 408 U.S. at 487.
See notes 83-85 and accompanying text, supra.
For a discussion of the mtut, of a parolee see note 34 and accompanying text, supra.
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to early release. A state may establish a parole release system, but it is not required to do so.8 9 Nevertheless, consideration for parole is guaranteed by
statute in virtually all jurisdictions. °
The procedures for determining an inmate's eligibility for parole release
vary by jurisdiction. As may be expected, courts have traditionally refused to
recognize any right of the prospective parolee to due process protections at his
parole release hearing. This view was recently reaffirmed by the Supreme Court
in Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex.9'
Greenholtz rejected the argument that a reasonable entitlement requiring due
process protections was created whenever a state provided for the possibility of
parole.92
In answering the question of whether a protectible interest exists in parole
release hearings, the Court resorted to the narrow entitlement doctrine.93 The
Court reasoned that the Constitution only protects a present status or right.
Because the conditional freedom afforded the prisoner by parole does not arise
until after the parole release hearing, the Court found no constitutional entitlement. Without some statutory entitlement to early release, the inmate has
merely a hope that the benefit of parole will be granted.94 He is thus not entitled to constitutional protections where there exists only the mere possibility
of parole release.
The Court dismissed Morrissey and its impact analysis 95 because of the distinctions it found between parole release and revocation.96 Release involves
potential freedom, while parole revocation involves existing freedom which is
presently enjoyed.97 Under an impact analysis, such a distinction is of questionable validity. Whether a prisoner or a parolee, an individual suffers a similar
significant impact, loss of liberty in the future, from an adverse parole release
or revocation decision. In addition, parole release is no longer an act of
clemency granted a few exemplary prisoners. It is the primary rehabilitative
measure that reintegrates inmates into society. Recent studies demonstrate the
pervasive use of parole in our correctional system: fifty-four to seventy-five
percent of all inmates are released from prison as paroleesY8 Thus, it is surely
89. Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Neb. Penal & Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 7 (1979).
90. See 18 U.S.C. §§4202, 4203(a) (1970). All the states have some form of parole statutes
authorizing the discretionary release of prisoners. However, certain prisoners are never eligible
for early release because of a mandatory sentencing scheme for certain egregious crimes. Newman, Court Intervention in the Parole Process, 36 ALB. L. R1v. 257 (197 2).
91. 442 U.S. 1 (1979).
92. Id. at 8-9.
93. See notes 19-22 and accompanying text, supra.
94. In Greenholtz the Court did, however, find such a statutory entitlement in the
Nebraska Parole Statute at issue in the case. NEB. REv. STAT. §83-1,114 (1976). Looking to the
particular statute's "unique structure and language," the decision found an expectation of
parole "entitled to some measure of protection." 442 U.S. at 12. The Court relied upon
Nebraska's statutory mandate that parole "shall" be granted absent a specific finding by the
Parole Board that one of several designated reasons for denial is found. Id. at 11-12.
95. See notes 39-43 and accompanying text, supra.
96. 442 U.S. at 10.

97. Id.
98.

See CrrizENs' INQUIRY ON PAROLE AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE, PRISON WITHOUT WALLS: RE-
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an anomaly to find that such a potentially grievous loss as denial of parole is
not entitled to due process protections.
Procedural safeguards would protect both the inmate and the state from
arbitrary parole release decisions. The state has a significant interest in fair
and accurate parole hearings that release inmates as soon as they are considered
ready, a practice due process safeguards could help ensure. Parole is certainly
cheaper than continued incarceration.- Even more important is the evidence
that prolonged incarceration decreases the likelihood of a productive return to
society. 00
Where a protectible entitlement to parole is conferred by a particular statutory scheme, due process procedures must be formulated which balance the
state's desire for speed and efficiency in processing parole applications with the
inmate's interest in a fair and accurate decision regarding his suitability for
early release. The Supreme Court in Greenholtz found such a statutory entitlement to parole 01 and formulated three procedural requirements for constitutional sufficiency. First, the inmate must have the opportunity to be heard at
the parole release hearing. 102 Second, he must be provided adequate notice con-

cerning the hearing.10 3 Third, he must be given a statement of the reasons relied upon if parole is denied.104 Requiring a formal hearing and a statement of
the evidence relied upon in denying parole were rejected as not being constitutionally mandated. The Court determined these safeguards would do little, if
anything, to minimize the risk of error in the release decision and would tend
to convert the parole hearing into an adversary proceeding. 0 5
Considering the benefits which accrue to the state from fair and accurate
parole release decisions, TM the Court has again given too much weight to the
state's potential burden in deciding what procedural protections are required
by due process. Parole boards can and should provide several procedures which
would help ensure fair and accurate decisions without unduly impacting on
administrative efficiency. Foremost among these is a requirement of advance
notice of the day and time of the hearing. Without adequate notice of the
proceeding, all other due process protections become meaningless. Prior notice

PARoLE (1975); Kastenmeler & Eglit, Parole Release Decision-Making:
Rehabilitation,Expertise, and the Demise of Mythology, 22 AM. U.L. Rlv. 477, 481 (1973).
PO RT ON NEW YoRi

See also 408 U.S. at 477.
99. Comment, The ParoleSystem, 120 U. PA. L. Rxv. 282,294 n.76 (1971).
100. Bixby, A New Role for ParoleBoards, FED. PRoBATION, June, 1970 at 24.
101. See note 96 supra.

102. See notes 71-73 and accompanying text, supra.
103. The dissent and concurrence in Greenholtz both vigorously disagreed with the
majority's finding that the notice at issue in the case was constitutionally adequate. The
method of notice informed the inmate in advance as to the month his parole hearing would
be held, but, did not inform him of the exact day and time of his hearing until the morning
of that day. The result was only a few hours advance notice to the inmate. 442 U.S. at 22
(Marshall, J., dissenting); id. at 21 (Powell, J., concurring).
104. Id. at 14.
105. Id. at 15-16.

106. See notes 99-100 and accompanying text, supra.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1981

15

Florida Law Review, Vol. 33, Iss. 2 [1981], Art. 1
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXXIII

should be at least three to five days rather than the few hours notice sanctioned
by the Court as adequate.107
Additionally, the parole applicant should be given advance access to the
information on which the parole board will rely in making its decision. He
should also be afforded the opportunity to submit a written statement prior to
the hearing and the opportunity at the hearing to explain or to rebut any adverse information. Such procedures would allow the inmate to efficiently present
his side of the issues and to point out any discrepancies in the record.
As in prison disciplinary proceedings, counsel-substitutes should be mandated in parole release hearings whenever there are material fact discrepancies
or whenever the issues involved are too complex to be effectively presented by
the particular inmate. 108 Counsel-substitute's role could be limited to assisting
in the presentation of complex information without turning the parole hearing
into a full adversarial affair.
Finally, the inmate should be provided a list of the factors relied upon by
the board in denying parole. This would allow the inmate to understand why
he is not considered ready for conditional release and would help relieve the
frustration that results from not knowing how to improve the chance for future
parole. With such information, the prisoner could concentrate on those areas
of rehabilitation which would best prepare him for reintegration into society.
By resorting to an unduly narrow entitlement analysis of the prisoner's interest in parole release hearings, the Supreme Court has found that no due
process rights are constitutionally mandated at such proceedings unless the
state grants a statutory right to parole release. When a statutory entitlement
creates constitutional protections, the Court has set forth minimum procedures
which give little consideration to the interests of both the parole applicant and
the state. The additional safeguards suggested above would not appear to place
any significant burden on the state, yet would greatly advance the goals of accurate factfinding and informal decisionmaking in parole release hearings.
CONCLUSION

In the current era of prison unrest and public concern over the correctional
system, it is appropriate that courts have shown a willingness to recognize and
protect the constitutional rights of prisoners and parolees. These individuals
are among the least powerful segments of our society. Thus, the courts' rulings
have done much to allow the due process clause of our Constitution to perform
its intended function of guarding the vulnerable from unbridled and arbitrary
governmental action. Yet, by adopting a narrow entitlement view in many of
its recent decisions, the Supreme Court has required that prisoners have a
statutory right to an interest before it may be constitutionally protected. Unfortunately, the Court has ignored the significant impact or grievous loss a
prisoner may suffer from arbitrary governmental action regarding some interest
of life, liberty or property which by chance is not anchored upon a specific
statutory foundation. Such a view of due process protections places a large, un107. See note 74 supra.
108. See note 77 supra.
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checked power in the legislature, and is contrary to the Court's clear constitutional mandate under the fourteenth amendment to oversee the use of state
authority impinging upon such interests.
Even when an interest is found which requires constitutional protections,
the Court has been primarily concerned with the state's additional burden in
supplying procedural due process protections in correctional administrative
hearings. Largely ignored are the benefits the state will derive from fair, accurate decisions in these proceedings that additional due process safeguards
would help ensure. Hopefully, the legislatures will supply the requisite safeguards that the Court has said the Constitution cannot.
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